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TRADITION AND AUTHORITATIVE REASONING:
A NONFOUNDATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE
JOHN E. THIEL
Fairfield University, Connecticut

of Roman Catholic theology is the authority
accorded to tradition as a normative source for its interpretation
A
alongside Scripture and, at least in the modern period, experience. In
DISTINCTIVE TRAIT

the 19th and 20th centuries, theologians have come to recognize that
the authority of ecclesial tradition can be reconciled with the fact of its
historical development, a view that is by now an axiom of Catholic
theology as well as an interpretive assumption of the magisterium.1
And yet surprisingly, little critical attention has been given to how
tradition is authoritative for theology when tradition is itself developing dramatically.
In these pages I would like to reflect on this issue, first, by proposing
a criterion for the tentative identification of dramatically developing
doctrine, second, by considering the teachings of Humanae vitae and
Inter insigniores as possible illustrations of such doctrine, and third, by
examining the issues of authority and theological responsibility in
relation to a shared characteristic of these doctrines, i.e. the magisterium's use of reasoning and argument in its teaching. In the fourth and
fifth sections, nonfoundationalist criticism will provide a constructive
resource for understanding the workings of reasoning in magisterial
teaching and the expectations of such reasoning in the developing
Catholic tradition.
DRAMATICALLY DEVELOPING DOCTRINE: DEFINITION AND CRITERIA

By "dramatically" developing doctrine, I mean doctrine that is developing in such a way that its current authority as the authentic
teaching of the magisterium will be lost at some later moment in the
life of the Church, and that exhibits signs in the present moment that
this final loss has begun to take place. The authority of such doctrine
in the Church's present life presents a knotty problem for all in the
Church, though here our concern will focus on Catholic theologians
1
The Second Vatican Council's "Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation" explicitly teaches the development of Catholic tradition (Dei verbum no. 8). Translations of the
conciliar documents are from Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post-Conciliar Documents, ed. A. Flannery, O.P. (Northport, N.Y.: Costello, 1987). A more recent statement
of the International Theological Commission, which one can assume enjoys the support
of the magisterium, outlines normative principles for theological interpretation in the
context of developing tradition; see On the Interpretation of Dogmas (April 21,1990), in
Origins 20 no. 1 (17 May 1994) 1-14.
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and their work. On the one hand, Catholic theologians affirm their
interpretive responsibility to the "Word of God, whether in its written
form or in the form of Tradition," i.e. the "doctrine, life, and worship"
of the Church handed down "to every generation." Moreover, Catholic
theologians recognize the authority of the teaching office or magisterium of the Church which has been entrusted with "the task of giving
an authentic interpretation of the Word of God."2 On the other hand,
as moderns, Catholic theologians recognize the fact of the development
of doctrine and the role played by creative theological reflection in
promulgating that development through the years. Moreover, historico-critical study has demonstrated that doctrine occasionally has
developed in such a way that the authentic teaching of the magisterium in an earlier historical moment later lost authority.3 As they
encounter doctrine presently and authentically taught by the magisterium, Catholic theologians sometimes find themselves judging that a
doctrine will undergo development in this fashion, so that the authoritative teaching of today will not be the authoritative teaching of some
tomorrow. Hence our knotty problem: How is tradition, in the midst of
such development, authoritative for theology?
This knotty problem, of course, also suggests another: By what criteria does the theologian judge authentic teaching to be currently in a
state of "dramatic development"? There are several ways of answering
this question. An answer of wide interpretive latitude might suggest
that all doctrine is developing because even the most basic teachings of
tradition are always being appropriated anew in the present moment
of faith. Karl Rahner expresses this sensibility in his well-known observation that the Chalcedonian decree on the person of Christ is not
an end but a beginning, i.e. of interpretive meaning.4 If all doctrine
remains in development in this way, then one might think that dramatic development is always at least a possibility for all doctrine. Such
cannot be the case, however, for were this possibility to be realized for
a doctrine as basic as the Chalcedonian dogma, the result would be
the development of another tradition rather than the development of
doctrine within the Catholic tradition. Clearly, then, all doctrine cannot develop dramatically, at least not without rendering the matters
2
3

Dei verbum nos. 8, 10.
See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., "Development in Moral Doctrine," TS 54 (1993)
662—77. Noonan's examples are magisterial teachings on the moral issues of usury,
marriage, slavery, and religious freedom. An example of development in a doctrine of
faith leading to its loss of authority is Pius XII's exclusion of Christians not in communion with Rome from membership in the Church in the encyclical Mystici corporis
Christi (no. 102), a teaching reversed in Vatican IFs "Decree on Ecumenism" (Unitatis
redintegratio no. 3). See John H. Wright, S.J., "That All Doubt May Be Removed,"
America 171 no. 3 (30 July 1994) 18-19.
4
Karl Rahner, "Current Problems in Christology," in Theological Investigations 1,
trans. C. Ernst (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961) 149-51.
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under consideration moot for want of the very tradition in which they
are meaningful.
Our search for criteria for judging when doctrine is currently in a
state of dramatic development might appeal to Catholic dogmatic presuppositions themselves. At the very least, one might think, doctrine
that is not infallible may be capable of dramatic development. Yet this
negative and minimal criterion, it turns out, is useless for making our
judgment concretely because it begs the question in two respite. First,
since the infallibility of doctrine expresses the infallibility of the whole
Church's faith, that infallibility often does not reach theyievel of explicit definition, say, in the decrees of ecumenical councils and the
occasional pronouncements of the extraordinary magisterium. Thus,
while the assumptions of Catholic dogma seem to imply that dramatic
development could only occur among noninfallible doctrines, the lack
of explicit definition of infallible teaching makes it/difficult to know
with precision which doctrines are infallible and which are not. This,
of course, is just a more fundamental way of stating our initial problem
of determining criteria for doctrine currently in a state of dramatic
development. Second, reference to a doctrine's noninfallible character
as a minimal criterion for judging an instance of dramatic development means little if that doctrine is taught authentically by the magisterium, presumably as the unerring faith of the whole Church. Catholic theologians are responsible to that authentic teaching and yet
know that on several occasions magisterial teaching has developed
dramatically. This dilemma again brings us to our problem. No facile
distinction between infallible and noninfallible doctrines, then, will
enable us to identify dramatically developing doctrine with any reliability.
Catholic belief in the infallibility of the Church, though, suggests
another criterion that proves more reliable. According to the Second
Vatican Council, the "whole body of the faithful who have an anointing
that comes from the holy one . . . cannot err in matters of belief." This
unerring belief appears in "the supernatural appreciation of the faith
(sensus fidei) of the whole people, when . .. they manifest a universal
consent in matters of faith or morals."5 The sensus fidei is not a selfsubsistent belief isolated from other dimensions of ecclesial life and
practice, including the hierarchical teaching office. Indeed, the unerring sense of the faith is guided by the magisterium, relying on its
teaching for the preservation of its truth. Yet, at the same time, the
sense of the faith is the faith of the "People of God,... from the bishops
to the last of the faithful,"6 and so it cannot simply be reduced to the
teaching of the magisterium. Magisterial teaching that has not been
received in belief and practice by a wide segment of the faithful, then,
5

Lumen gentium no. 12.

6

Ibid.
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offers a more reliable, but still incomplete, criterion for judging when
doctrine is currently in a state of dramatic development.
This criterion is not without its ambiguities. Sociological findings
may be helpful in locating teaching not received by the faithful, but
polling results alone cannot establish the extent of doctrinal reception.
In addition, there remains the theological issue of how one understands Lumen gentium's reference to "the whole body of the faithful" in
which infallibility resides. Does this phrase refer to the baptized, to
practitioners of the faith, or more self-referentially to those who do
indeed possess the unerring sense of the faith, however difficult it may
be to determine its character or their number? This question points to
the inherent difficulties attending judgments about doctrinal reception. Although appeal may be made to social-scientific data in testing
the reception of doctrine in the Church, one must rely finally on the
sense of the faith itself in judging whether doctrine has been received
by the faithful, who in turn evaluate the legitimacy of the judgment. In
any case, defining the unerring faithful as those who receive all magisterial teaching in faith and practice wrongly equates the infallibility
of the Church with obedience to the magisterium in any particular
historical moment, and ignores both the dynamics of doctrinal development and the fact of dramatic development in the tradition. The
criterion of reception, then, remains ambiguous, though by nature and
not by fault. This ambiguity can be mitigated somewhat by two supplementary criteria.
A second criterion forjudging current dramatic development is that
the magisterium also invokes theological argument in the presentation of its teaching. The magisterial practice of supporting teaching
with or actually offering teaching through theological argument can
be found as early in the tradition as Leo Fs fifth-century Tome on the
person of Christ7 or as recently as an encyclical of Paul VI and an
instruction of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to which
we will soon turn for examples.8 The magisterial use of argument to
convey authentic teaching is not necessarily a symptom of its noninfallible character, as the illustration of Leo's Tome, a strong textual
influence on the Chalcedonian decree, testifies. But the use of theological argument in magisterial teaching is a reliable symptom that the
doctrine taught is in a state of development which itself prompts the
need for argument. There are three reasons for this argumentative
7

Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum
de Rebus Fidei et Morum, 33d ed. (Freiburg im Briesgau: Herder, 1966) 102-104, nos.
290-95. There is an English translation of the complete text in Christology of the Later
Fathers, ed. E. Hardy (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1954) 360-70.
8
Comparisons of magisterial practice across centuries yet must acknowledge the different understandings of teaching authority that have flourished in the Church; see
Yves Congar, O.P., "A Semantic History of the Term 'Magisterium,' " in Readings in
Moral Theology No. 3: The Magisterium and Morality, ed. Charles Curran and Richard
McCormick (New York: Paulist, 1982) 306-7.
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need to which we can refer respectively as the circumstantial, the
logical, and the rhetorical. First, argument is deemed necessary because the teaching addresses changing cultural circumstances in
which a simple reiteration of traditional doctrine would not suffice.
Argument serves as a way of mediating traditional meaning to novel
issues, problems, or situations. Second, argument is deemed necessary
because this mediated teaching requires a specific and convincing application of the tradition's more basic beliefs, an application that represents a movement to doctrine more derivative, though not necessarily less authoritative. Logic (here following its traditional rules!)
serves the magisterium by demonstrating the reasonableness of the
application, by showing how the teaching's conclusion derives its authority from a major premise (more basic beliefs) rightly modified by
its minor (changing cultural circumstances).9 Third, argument is
deemed necessary because unanimity in the Church is lacking for the
doctrine in question. Argument thus has the rhetorical goal of persuasion.
These first two criteria for dramatic development, when taken together—magisterial teaching that one judges not to have been widely
received by the faithful and that presents its teaching through theological argument—provide good direction for determining doctrine
clearly in a state of development. A third criterion must be added,
however, for distinguishing development that is more likely to be dramatic. That criterion, itself a supplement to the previous two, is that
the theological argument by which magisterial teaching is supported
or conveyed does not prove convincing to a wide segment of Catholic
theologians. If the magisterium supports or conveys its teaching by the
logical application of more basic beliefs to changing circumstances in
order to persuade the faithful who are disinclined toward its reception,
and that argumentation does not convince a wide segment of those in
the Church knowledgeable about the tradition to which it appeals and
able to assess the viability of the argumentative application to present
circumstances, then there is a greater likelihood that such teaching is
developing dramatically than if such conditions did not prevail. Dramatic development could be encouraged in such an eventuality as theologians offered criticism of the current teaching, showing how and why
the doctrinal argument advanced did not justify the teaching or offering alternative arguments that advanced another version of consistency with traditional beliefs and with the current beliefs of many in
the Church.
The addition of this criterion to the first two might suggest some
misunderstandings that need to be addressed quickly. First, this criterion's attention to the cogency of magisterial argument among theo9
For an interesting discussion of logical mediation in religious doctrinal traditions,
see William A. Christian, Sr., Doctrines of Religious Communities: A Philosophical
Study (New Haven: Yale University, 1987) esp. 12-114.
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logians should not suggest that theologians speak for all the faithful.
All the faithful are not concerned with arguments for the justification
of belief or argument as the expression of belief, whereas theologians
as a matter of professional knowledge and responsibility are. With
respect to the matter of cogency in magisterial argument, they thus
offer a gauge that one would not expect to find among large numbers
of the faithful. Second, this criterion could seem to regard theologians
as a final court of appeal in the assessment of the Church's teaching, as
though the authority of theologians trumped the authority of the magisterium. As already noted, this view is contrary to Catholic belief and
is not defended here. With regard to both of these concerns, this last
criterion has no standing in its own right, as though magisterial teaching would need to be cogent to theologians before its enduring value for
the Church could be established. Rather, this criterion is only meaningful in its relationship to the first two, all three together forming a
unified complex of criteria for distinguishing likely instances of dramatic development: magisterial teaching that one judges not to have
been widely received by the faithful and that presents its teaching
through theological argument that does not prove convincing to a wide
segment of theologians.
Our single evaluative principle attempts to identify dramatically
developing doctrine by way of counterpoint to the Catholic belief that
the infallibility of the Church dwells among all the faithful. It offers,
then, a criteriological via negativa whose powers of identification can
never constitute a proof, and no more than an indication, of doctrine in
dramatic development. We would do well to think of it as a heuristic
that enables us to consider our problem of the authority of such doctrine further, and we may do so by examining three examples of recent
magisterial teaching.
POSSIBLE EXAMPLES OF DRAMATICALLY DEVELOPING DOCTRINE

Paul VFs encyclical Humanae vitae ("On the Regulation of Birth,"
1968), and the teaching of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith Inter insigniores ("On the Question of the Admission of Women
to the Ministerial Priesthood," 1976), offer, I believe, examples of
church teaching that fit our now single criterion of dramatic development. We can proceed by examining each in turn with regard to the
three aspects of our criterion: reception, argument, and cogency.
Humanae Vitae
Humanae vitae develops by argumentation the teaching of Pius XFs
encyclical Casti connubii (1930) that it is sinful to "deliberately frustrate [the] natural power and purpose" of the "conjugal act [which] is
destined primarily by nature for the begetting of children."10 Paul VTs
10

Pius XI, Casti connubii (December 31, 1930), in The Papal Encyclicals: 1903-1939,
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1968 encyclical more specifically forbids the artificial regulation of
birth by direct abortion, direct sterilization, or by "any action, which
either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation"11 as contrary to the natural law
and thus to the will of God. Any consideration of this teaching's reception among the faithful would need to acknowledge differences among
the three forms of regulation that the teaching equally judges illicit.
Abortion, for example, differs from sterilization and any other artificial means of regulating birth because it involves "the direct interruption of the generative process already begun."12 And even though
many in the Church would qualify by context and circumstance the
encyclical's absolute strictures against abortion, "even for therapeutic
reasons,"13 few in the Church would not regard abortion as a tragic act.
On the other hand, many social-scientific studies conducted in the past
twenty-five years have found that a large percentage of Catholics do
not practice the encyclical's proscription of artificial, preventive means
of regulating births.14 Although I know of no sociological study that
has made such a comparison, I think it fair to say that among those
who do not practice this aspect of the encyclical's teaching few would
regard the use of artificial, preventive means of birth control to constitute a tragedy of the proportions of abortion. Indeed, few who practice such forms of birth control would regard their actions as tragic at
all. If this judgment is sound, then it is Humanae vitae's prohibition of
artificial, preventive means of birth control in particular that has not
found reception among a wide constituency of the faithful. Our further
consideration of the encyclical will focus on this aspect of its teaching
as a possible example of dramatically developing doctrine.
Humanae vitae presents its teaching through argument for all three
reasons noted above. The encyclical begins by noting the changing
historical circumstances that have prompted its teaching, among them
the rapid increase in the world's population, a new social understanding of the dignity of women, and technological advances that permit
the rational control of nature, including the natural laws of reproduced. C. Carlen (Raleigh, N.C.: McGrath, 1981) 391-414, no. 54. For a most thorough
discussion of the history of the teaching, see John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A
History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University, 1965).
11
Paul VI, Humanae vitae (July 25,1968), in The Papal Encyclicals: 1958-1981, ed. C.
Carlen (Raleigh, N.C.: McGrath, 1981) 223-33, no. 14.
12
13
Ibid.
Ibid.
14
A typical statistic is offered in a recent Gallup poll which found that 84% of American Catholics believed they "should be allowed to practice artificial means of birth
control," while 13% believed they should not be allowed (The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion
1993 [Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1994] 145). A 1994 New York Times/CBS
News poll found that 98% of American Catholics 18-29 years of age practice artificial
birth control, 91% of those 30-44, 85% of those 45-64, and 72% of those 65 and older
(The New York Times [1 June 1994] B8).
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tion. One might see Paul VTs unprecedented formation of an advisory commission (and one that included lay members) to study and
report to him on the issues of the encyclical as an expression of his
keen sense that the Church faced circumstances novel enough to preclude a simple reiteration of the teaching of Casti connubii. To the
encyclical's own list of such circumstances one might add the growing
lack of the traditional teaching's reception among the faithful.
The logical argument developed in Humanae vitae to defend the
prohibition of artificial, preventive forms of birth control is relatively
simple. Its major premise is the basic Christian belief that all lives
should be open, and faithful in action, to God's will. This major is
qualified by two minor premises: God's will is inscribed in the natural
law which governs procreative acts in marriage and the consummate
meaning of sexual union in marriage lies in its fecundity,16 and in the
inseparable connection between its "unitive" and "procreative significance," sexual union "fully retains its sense of true mutual love and its
ordination to the supreme responsibility of parenthood. .. ,"17 Logical
mediation from the major premise to the first of these two minor
premises results in the encyclical's particular conclusion bearing on
the intentional possibilities of the married couple pondering a reproductive decision: "From this it follows that they are not free to act as
they choose in the service of transmitting life, as if it were wholly up
to them to decide what is the right course to follow."18 Both minor
premises are invoked to arrive at the conclusion of the Church's traditional teaching:
The Church, nevertheless, in urging men to the observance of the precepts of
the natural law, which it interprets by its constant doctrine, teaches that each
and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the
procreation of human life.19
Artificial, preventive forms of birth control are forbidden because they
destroy this intrinsic relationship between the unitive and procreative
dimensions of sexual union, and thereby elevate the will of the married
couple above the will of God both for the general institution of marriage and for their particular lives. Since the encyclical begins by
acknowledging the "questions"20 these matters have provoked in the
Church, and moves to its final section by anticipating that "not everyone will easily accept this particular teaching,"*1 it offers its argument
in recognition of a lack of unanimity among the faithful on this issue,
undoubtedly with persuasion as one its goals.
Demonstrating that the argument of Humanae vitae has not proved
cogent to a wide segment of theologians would be a rather redundant
15
17
19
21

Humanae vitae no. 2.
Ibid. no. 12.
Ibid. no. 11.
Ibid. no. 18.

16
18
20

Ibid. no. 9.
Ibid. no. 10.
Ibid. nos. 1-3.
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task. Indeed, the many criticisms leveled by theologians at the encyclical's reasoning stand side by side with this teaching's lack of reception as the clearest illustrations of the problem of authority in the
contemporary Church. One would be hard-pressed to find a critic who
challenged the encyclical's major premise—that all lives should be
open, and faithful in action, to God's will. Humanae vitaés theological
critics addressed instead the validity of both minor premises, and the
manner of their logical relation to the major to yield the teaching's
conclusion. Charles Curran, for example, criticizes the encyclical's
"physicalism," its inscription of the divine will upon every conjugal act
as though providence works exclusively in the teleology of biological structures.22 And when reasoning is put at issue, the encyclical's
physicalist assumptions prevent its logic from distinguishing between
the major and minor premises in its argument. One might even say
that the argument's minor premises so eclipse its major that it becomes
impossible logically to reach the reasonable conclusion, say, that a
married couple could be open to the will of God by having a fecund
marriage while yet at times practicing artificial contraception. Joseph
Komonchak notes that the encyclical makes no attempt to justify what
we have called its minor premises and so, though appearing to be an
argument, is no argument at all.23 Karl Rahner observes that arguments from the natural law, like Humanae vitae% cannot prescind
from the expectation of logical cogency, since reasonableness is at least
one of the expectations of appeal to the natural law. And yet this
cogency, he judges, is lacking in the encyclical's line of argument
which does little more than state its premises.24
If space permitted, we could treat a number of other consequential
criticisms of the encyclical's argument, especially those that find a
conflict in moral intentionality posed by its approval of the rhythm
method of birth control. Let it suffice to say that the many theologians
who have criticized the teaching of Humane vitae have done so by
attending to the inconsistencies they have found in the reasoning with
which its teaching was promulgated.
Inter Insigniores
Inter insigniores, which presents a rationale for the Church's longestablished practice of restricting priestly ordination to men, is a
teaching published on October 15, 1976 by the Congregation for the
22
Charles E. Curran, "Natural Law and Contemporary Moral Theology," in Contraception: Authority and Dissent, ed. C. Curran (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969)
159-60. Cf. Charles E. Curran, Transition and Tradition in Moral Theology (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1979) 30-31.
23
Joseph A. Komonchak, "Humanae Vitae and Its Reception: Ecclesiological Reflections," TS 39 (1978) 252.
24
Karl Rahner, "On the Encyclical 'Humane Vitae,' " in Theological Investigations 11,
trans. D. Bourke (New York: Seabury, 1974) 276-77.
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Doctrine of the Faith with the approval of Paul VI. Like Humanae
vitae, Inter insigniores seems not to have met wide reception among the
faithful. In fact, sociological evidence suggests that the acceptability of
the ordination of women among Catholics in the years since the document's publication has increased substantially. For example (and one
typical of North American and Western European countries), a 1977
Gallup poll found 41% of American Catholics to favor the ordination of
women, a statistic that increased to 63% by 1993.25 As noted earlier,
one must be wary about reducing the sensus fidei to the findings of
sociologists and doubly wary about the Catholic beliefs of some nations
standing as the belief of the whole Church. Yet this increase of belief
in the ordination of women is telling, and enough so to judge that the
teaching of the Church in question has not been widely received by the
faithful. The most likely explanations for this increase are a growing
awareness of injustices toward women in traditional societies, the
strength of movements for the equal rights of women, and a resulting
expansion of the role of women in social structures and responsibilities
customarily reserved for men. One cannot completely discount, however, the influence of the document's argument itself on the increasingly wider lack of reception of the teaching among the faithful over
this period of time.26
We find in Inter insigniores all three reasons, circumstantial, logical,
and rhetorical, for the appeal to argument in the promulgation of magisterial teaching. The exclusive ordination of men to the priesthood is,
after all, a practice that dates in some form to the first-century Church.
The felt need to justify such an ancient practice stems from changing
circumstances in which argument is called upon to defeat challenges to
the tradition. The document's opening paragraphs identify those
changing circumstances as the modern recognition of the full equality
of women, the wider participation of women in the apostolate of the
Church, the unqualified admission of women to pastoral office in some
Protestant churches, and arguments by Catholic theologians for
the ordination of women to the priesthood.27
Logical mediation is deemed necessary in Inter insigniores to bring
the tradition's most basic beliefs to bear upon these changing circumstances. There are several ancillary arguments in the document that
25
The 1977 Gallup poll is cited in Leonard Swidler, "Roma Locuta, Causa Finita?" in
Women Priests: A Catholic Commentary on the Vatican Declaration, ed. L. Swidler and
A. Swidler (New York: Paulist, 1977) 3. A 1993 Gallup poll found that 33% of Catholic
respondents "strongly agreed" and 30% "moderately agreed" that it would be "a good
thing if women were allowed to be ordained as priests" (The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion
1993 144). A 1994 New York Times/CBS News poll found that 59% of American Catholics favored the ordination of women to the priesthood (The New York Times [1 June
1994] B8).
26
See Leonard Swidler, "Roma Locuta, Causa Finita?" 3.
27
Inter insigniores, "Vatican Declaration: Women in the Ministerial Priesthood," Origins 6 no. 33 (3 February 1977) 517-24, nos. 1, 3, 4.
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serve to refute defenses of the ordination of women based on Scripture
and history. The teaching notes in passing, for example, that the "undeniable influence of prejudices unfavorable to women" in the writings
of the Church Fathers had negligible effect on their pastoral practice
and spiritual direction.28 The argument "from origins" continues by
observing that "Jesus did not call any woman to become part of the
Twelve" even though his attitude toward women did not conform to,
and indeed even "deliberately and courageously broke with," the customs of his time.29 Moreover, the apostles did not consider women
candidates to complete the Twelve in the Pentecost Church, even
though Mary herself occupied a privileged place in their circle. Nor did
Paul extend fall ministerial powers to women.30 As important as these
arguments "from origins" are in the document for defending the continuity of ecclesial practice against counterarguments for change, they
are secondary to what we will call its argument "from representation."
Although Inter insigniores portrays its reasoning "from representation" as a matter "of clarifying [its] teaching by the analogy of faith"
and not as a matter "of bringing forward a demonstrative argument,"31
the manner in which its premises lead to its conclusion seem to involve
elementary deduction. The argument's major premise is the "Church's
constant teaching" that "the bishop or the priest, in the exercise of his
ministry, does not act in his own name, in persona propria: he represents Christ, who acts through him. ..." In the ministry, then, the
priest "acts not only through the effective power conferred on him by
Christ, but in persona Christi"*2 This major premise is qualified by the
minor premise that the incarnation of the Word "took place according
to the male sex," a fact that does not imply a superiority of men over
women but which nonetheless conveys a harmony in the plan of salvation revealed by God and symbolically important for the economy of
revelation.33 Logical mediation yields the conclusion of the teaching
that women cannot be priests because as females they could not act
ministerially in persona Christi since the savior was a male. This argument's minor premise addresses contemporary cultural shifts in
which feminist sensibilities would no longer assume that metaphysical
conceptions like persona are intrinsically male or would insist that
such conceptions transcend social (and ecclesial) bias only when they
are understood in a gender-inclusive manner. The rhetoric of the argument exhibits an awareness of the claims of these sensibilities and
of the need to convince those who find the traditional belief incredible—even to the point that the document anticipates and rebuffs counterarguments to the centrality it accords to the maleness of Christ.
As we found in the case oí Humanae vitae, so many theologians have
found the argumentation of Inter insigniores to be problematic that
Ibid. no. 6.
Ibid. nos. 14-17.
Ibid. no. 26.

M

Ibid. no. 10.
Ibid. no. 25.
33
Ibid. nos. 28, 30.
31
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demonstrating its lack of cogency to a wide segment of their number
becomes a redundant task. While several theological responses have
criticized Inter insigniores's appeals to Scripture and the history of
the early Church as legitimate warrant for its exclusion of women
from priestly ordination,34 the most consequential criticism has addressed the argument "from representation." Elizabeth Johnson,
among others, has criticized the crucial role of Jesus's maleness in the
argument by setting its notion of representation in the orthodox Christological tradition. The Cappadocian rule of faith "what is not assumed
is not saved," she notes, defined the proper understanding of human
persona in the fourth-century controversy on the humanity of Christ.
The rule judged wanting any notion of the humanity of Christ that
excluded anything essentially human from his existence, since the
excluded human dimension would not share in the hypostatic union
and so not enjoy the union's saving effects. "If maleness is constitutive
for the incarnation and redemption," Johnson observes, "female humanity is not assumed and therefore not saved."35 Privileging Jesus'
maleness as Inter insigniores does particularizes the human notion of
persona in a way that puts it at odds with the ancient rule of faith, thus
destroying both the Christian notion of human person implicit in the
rule and any possibility of its legitimate representation, even and perhaps especially if the object of representation is the person of Christ.
Johnson concludes that an "egalitarian anthropology that holds that
women and men are equally created in the image of God, and are
equally one in Christ through the waters of baptism" offers a more
adequate resource for considering the issue of priestly ordination.36
From the perspective of the argument's logical structure, we might
understand her point to be that such an egalitarian anthropology
would better shape a minor premise, and so properly qualify the major's largely uncontested expectation that the priest in ministerial duties represents the person of Christ.
Both teachings, then, appear to fit our criterion of dramatically developing doctrine, primarily because they seem not to have been
widely received by the faithful and secondarily, yet importantly, because they also advance their teaching by arguments that have not
34
E.g. Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "The Twelve," and "The Apostleship of Women
in Early Christianity," in Women Priests 114-22,135-40. Anne E. Carr points out that
making Jesus' practice normative for the Church's practice of ordination cannot in
principle sift the fact that he chose only males for the Twelve from the other traits that
his choice also involved: "if the practice of Jesus were followed in all aspects, married
men would have to be eligible for ordination—and only converted Jews could be ordained!" (Transforming Grace: Christian Tradition and Women's Experience [San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1988] 55).
35
Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological
Discourse (New York: Crossroad, 1992) 153.
36
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proved convincing to those in the Church professionally committed to
the task of bringing understanding to faith.
ARGUMENTS THAT MATTER NOT

The reader might benefit from a reminder at this point that our
efforts thus far to identify candidates for dramatically developing doctrine serve our broader purpose of considering the theological problem
of such doctrine's authority. One could address this issue in a general
fashion simply by reference to the large body of literature on authority
in the Church, the teaching prerogatives of the magisterium, and theological responsibility that has appeared since the Second Vatican
Council. I would like to pursue this question more specifically, though,
by focusing on two of the features proposed here for candidates for such
doctrine: the arguments offered to advance a teaching, and their cogency.
If both doctrines fit our criterion on the counts of reception, argument, and cogency, they also share another commonality with regard
to the latter two aspects. Humanae vitae directly and the broader magisterial tradition of Inter insigniores indirectly subscribe to the view
that finally neither their arguments nor the cogency of their arguments are consequential to the authority of their teaching. Humanae
vitae expresses this position in its pastoral directives to priests:
For it is your principal duty—We are speaking especially to you who teach
moral theology—to spell out clearly and completely the Church's teaching on
marriage. In the performance of your ministry you must be thefirstto give an
example ofthat sincere obedience, inward as well as outward, which is due to
the magisterium of the Church. For, as you know, the pastors of the Church
enjoy a special light of the Holy Spirit in teaching the truth. And this, rather
than 37
the arguments they put forward, is why you are bound to such obedience.
This same point is made indirectly in the magisterium's recent
teaching on the exclusion of women from priestly ordination, not in
Inter insigniores but in John Paul IFs promulgation of its doctrine in
Ordinatio saeerdotalis ("Apostolic Letter on Ordination and Women,"
May 22, 1994). This text notes the conclusions of Inter insigniores's
arguments "from origins," fails to mention what many would consider
to be its principal argument "from representation," reiterates the constancy of the Church's universal tradition in excluding women from
priestly ordination, and concludes with the pope's particular contribution to the issue:
Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be removed regarding a matter of great
importance, a matter which pertains to the church's divine constitution itself,
Humanae vitae no. 28.
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in virtue of my ministry of confirming the brethren . . . I declare that the
church has no authority whatsoever to confer priestly ordination on women38
and that this judgment is to be definitively held by all the church's faithful.
The status and purport of this teaching continue to be discussed in the
Church. For our purposes it is important to note that the pope provides
the context for his teaching in the remarks that precede the declara
tion quoted above. In spite of the Church's consistent teaching even to
the present day, the reservation of priestly ordination to men alone, he
states, "in some places . . . is nonetheless considered still open to de
bate, or the church's judgment that women are not to be admitted to
ordination is considered to have a merely disciplinary force."39 If the
Apostolic Letter responds to these circumstances and offers its teach
ing with the intention of removing doubt in the Church, then at least
one of its purposes is to close debate on this issue. This purpose, I
suggest, coupled with the Letter's omission of reference to Inter insigniores's central and most debated argument, amounts to an admission
that neither magisterial arguments for the exclusion of women from
priestly ordination nor their cogency finally matter, since the charism
of the Church's teaching office alone is the basis of its authority.
The final dispensability of argument in magisterial teachings con
veyed by argument is affirmed as a general principle in the Congre
gation for the Doctrine of the Faith's Instruction on the Ecclesial Vo
cation of the Theologian (May 24, 1990). The Instruction addresses
several matters concerning the responsibility of theologians to the
magisterium, focusing particularly on the legitimacy and means of
theological dissent from authentic teaching. One way in which theo
logians defend the legitimacy of dissent from "non-irreformable mag
isterial teaching,"40 it claims, is by adopting a hermeneutical posture
that regards such teaching only as one voice among many in an ongo
ing theological debate. "Certainly," the Instruction responds,
it is one of the theologian's tasks to give a correct interpretation to the texts of
the magisterium, and to this end he employs various hermeneutical rules.
Among these is the principle which affirms that magisterial teaching, by vir
tue of divine assistance, has a validity beyond
its argumentation, which may
derive at times from a particular theology.41
Right theological interpretation, then, should regard the argumenta
tion of magisterial teaching as supplementary to its conclusion, as, on
the one hand, a dimension of its presentation that theologians must
42
strive to understand with an "intense and patient reflection" and yet,
38
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on the other hand, a dispensable contingency should such reflection
fail to yield the understanding sought.
When all sincere effort to appreciate the truth of magisterial teaching has proved fruitless, the theologian may express personal dissent
only by the means of confiding privately in the magisterial authorities.
One concern that might be communicated in this one valid practice of
dissent is how "the arguments proposed to justify [the teaching]" are
problematic. And when voiced privately, such objections can have the
happy consequence of contributing "to real progress and [providing] a
stimulus to the magisterium to propose the teaching of the church in
greater depth and with a clearer presentation of the arguments."43
While one rejoices in any manifestation of collegiality, reconciliation,
and progress in the doctrine of the faith, one cannot help but notice
that the results of this private consultation extend only to magisterial
argumentation and not to magisterial conclusion. As a result, argumentation becomes a gloss to conclusion—a supplement capable of
clarification, modification, or even as much as separation without fear
of effect upon the teaching it purports to convey. Perhaps the Instruction's expectation that an unsatisfactory resolution to private consultation is a call to the theologian "to suffer for the truth, in silence and
prayer"44 is yet another expression of its view that the weighing of
ecclesial argument in public would be as useless as it is scandalous
since the argumentative dimension of magisterial teaching finally
matters not.
Clearly the tone of our analysis suggests that something is amiss in
the presumed separability of argument and conclusion in the authentic
teaching of the magisterium. In the final section of this article I will
try to show how the assumed contingency of magisterial argumentation bears on the theological problem of the authority of dramatically
developing doctrine. At this point, however, I would state unequivocally that this problem cannot be addressed by undermining in any
way the charismatic authority of the Church's teaching office, itself
one of the tradition's basic beliefs. A more fruitful approach to this
problem would consider how reasoning properly justifies a tradition of
basic beliefs and through such justification gains cogency among faithful believers. The account of epistemic justification offered by nonfoundationalist philosophers can help to shed light on these issues.
ARGUMENTS WITHOUT "FOUNDATIONS"

While there is no definable school that represents the epistemologica! sensibilities of nonfoundationalism, one could at least find a family resemblance of such philosophical commitments in the tradition of
American pragmatism. Building on the work of an older generation
Ibid. no. 30.

Ibid. no. 31; emphasis mine.
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that includes Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John
Dewey, contemporary pragmatiste like Wilfrid Sellare, Willard Van
Orman Quine, Richard Rorty, and Richard Bernstein share several
common assumptions that could be described as nonfoundationalist.45
All are keenly suspicious of the Cartesian understanding of the philosophical task in which thinking is called upon to establish a "first
philosophy," an architectonic of all knowledge grounded on some immediately experienced, self-certain principle that serves as "foundations" for the entire edifice of knowledge. All oppose traditional understandings of the philosophical justification of belief in which reasoning is expected to show the validity of claims to knowledge finally
by appeal to indubitable "foundations" on which such claims rest. All
regard the business of philosophy, at least at this moment in its history, as the criticism of Cartesianism and the formulation of more
adequate accounts of knowing in which claims to knowledge are justified without appeal to foundationalist principles.
Although the nonfoundationalists frequently personify the foundationalist error by reference to Descartes, foundationalism is as old as
the Platonic tradition in Western philosophy. Whether the "foundations" of knowing appear in philosophical accounts as Plato's eternal
forms, Descartes's clear and distinct ideas, the givenness of sense experience for Locke, or Kant's transcendental categories of the understanding, they are esteemed by their proponents as immediately justified beliefs whose certainty justifies more derivative claims in the
larger body of knowledge. Since the very purpose of "foundations" is to
assure the indubitability of knowledge, or at the very least the possibility of such unquestioned certainty, foundationalists ascribe universality to whatever principle they advance as the authenticator of truth
claims. As Richard Rorty observes, foundationalists seem to assume
that epistemic "foundations" possess an immediate veridical élan that
permeates the entire system of knowledge and "causes" whatever
truth dwells among its mediate claims.46 Noninferential and indisputable, the "foundations" provide a point of departure for logical deduction or a foothold for thinking's inductive climb toward valid knowledge.
Generally speaking, one could say that nonfoundationalist criticism
makes its target any variety of rationalism or empiricism that expects
"foundations" for knowledge, whether in ideas or sense data, to establish the certainty of epistemic claims. Traditionally, foundationalists
have been anxious at the prospect of justifying claims to knowledge if
45
For the discussion that follows I have relied on the presentation of nonfoundationalist philosophies in my Nonfoundationalism, Guides to Theological Inquiry (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994) 1-37.
46
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University, 1979) 157.
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such foundations do not exist. Claims to knowledge, after all, can only
be justified by appealing to other claims to knowledge. And if there is
not an utterly basic claim, a knowledge whose immediate certainty is
indubitable, then, the foundationalist fears, the justification of knowledge becomes a dizzying, infinite spiral of skepticism in which even the
possibility of certainty in any instance is jeopardized. Nonfoundationalist philosophers have argued that this, in Richard Bernstein's wellknown diagnosis, "Cartesian anxiety" is a needless worry, though one
prompted by strong, epistemic prejudices.47
The philosopher of science Wilfrid Sellars has argued that the foundationalist conceptualization of knowledge is energized by what he
calls the "myth of the given," the "idea that there are inner episodes,
whether thoughts or so-called 'immediate experiences,' to which each
of us has privileged access," inner episodes furnishing "premises on which
empirical knowledge rests as on a foundation."48 While the givenness
of experience is an ordinary fact of epistemic life, the imbuing of a
particular dimension of experience with an authoritative givenness
leads to the foundationalist schema of knowledge, in which a supposedly certain experience is called upon to provide assurances that it
really cannot. There is no evidence, Sellars contends, that such a foundational, unmoved mover of knowledge exists. Indeed, as any number
of the critics of foundationalism have been quick to point out, the
many, and quite different, candidates for "foundations" in the history
of philosophy mutually deconstruct their respective claims to immediate and obvious certainty.
Typically, nonfoundationalists argue against foundationalism by offering a view of knowledge in which its claims are relatively and mutually defined, and in which the justification of knowledge is an ongoing, révisable enterprise. Sellars, for example, points out that even the
most basic report of a supposedly foundational sense experience—as in
the claim "This looks red"—presupposes such a proliferating host of
concepts, conditions, and circumstances that our wider network of
claims to knowledge is inescapably implicated. And in this wider network, epistemic claims are mutually constituted without appeal to any
truth that is immediately given. Knowledge cannot but be inferential,
even if one can distinguish between more basic or more complex dimensions of its inferential character. In Sellars's judgment, this reciprocity between more basic and more complex modes of inferential
knowledge does not compromise the authority of knowledge itself, but
only the foundationalist authority of the myth of the given. "For empirical knowledge," he states, "like its sophisticated extension, science,
47
Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics,
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is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a selfcorrecting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not
all at once."49
Like Sellars, Willard Van Orman Quine rejects any rationalist or
traditionally empiricist manner of accounting for human knowledge.
Philosophy, he claims, provides no "a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science." Nor does it offer some "external vantage point" from
which knowledge can be constructed. Rather, philosophy is "continuous with science."50 Its task involves the critical examination of the
formation of concepts from sensory evidence, the work of scientific
construction itself. For Quine, though, the process of concept formation
is inseparable from the formation of meaning in words, sentences, and
the entire system of language itself. "Meaning is," Quine insists, "what
it does," and what it does is place value on sensory stimulations in
particular circumstances. Meaning is not a transcendental quality, a
foundation on which sentences must rest in order to possess meaning,
but a function of how sentences are used and through such use acquire
significance.51 Meaning, then, is behaviorally layered within the complex strands of sentences that configure the "web" of belief, Quine's
compelling metaphor for knowledge itself. Though a foundationalist,
to pursue the metaphor, might expect the web's fixed integrity to rest
upon a single strand, Quine situates the web's meaningfulness in the
constant revisions to its weaving called for by the circumstances of its
use. Our "statements about the external world," he maintains, "face
the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body."52 And the corporate body of knowledge is not only foundationless but also utterly flexible.
Sellars's and Quine's nonfoundationalist perspective on the constitution of knowledge also has implications for their understanding of
epistemic justification, i.e. the task of providing arguments of sufficient warrant for claims to knowledge or beliefs. Clearly, if knowledge
does not possess foundations, then neither do the arguments one offers
to justify beliefs. We have already noted that the prospect of foundationless belief stirs the foundationalist's fear of an infinite justificatory
regress in which even the possibility of warranted claims would be
undercut. Sellars and Quine, however, do not find this prospect threatening. The arguments by which belief is justified, they hold, need not
lead logically to a final grounding principle that brings the business of
making justificatory arguments to closure. Both regard justificatory
49
50
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argumentation in support of claims to knowledge as an activity internal to the claims for which one argues.
For Sellars, justifications of belief fall within the scope of theorizing,
the activity of explaining the beliefs we hold. Their arguments, he
proposes, are best understood as self-correcting, inductive generalizations, as accounts of a rational system's reasonable coherence offered
from within its own network of belief. Similarly, Quine affirms this
contextual, self-referential view of justification in what has come to be
known as his doctrine of holism. According to this thesis, parts of
theories, including for our purposes justificatory arguments, are "not
separately vulnerable to adverse observations, because it is only jointly
as a theory that they imply their observable consequences."53 Parts of
theories, in other words, including the reasoned arguments on behalf
of more basic background beliefs, do not simply collapse in the face of
conflicting data. Justificatory arguments so foster the basic beliefs
they serve—the two utterly intertwined in the proliferating network
of claims to knowledge—that contrary evidence more typically will
lead to their revision than to their abandonment. Both Sellars and
Quine reject what Michael Williams has called a "genetic" conception
of justification in which the cogency of arguments on behalf of beliefs
is assumed to be caused by the immediately certain, foundationalist
principle to which they are logically joined. Both understand justificatory argumentation to be as foundationless, continuous, and resistant to closure as our efforts to accommodate our language to experience.
The purport of Sellars's and Quine's nonfoundationalist view on the
task of justification is that what we call knowledge is its justification,
itself an open-ended process of explaining—we might say arguing
for—the beliefs valued in particular meaningful contexts. In the absence of "foundations," arguments are the principal means by which
basic beliefs are themselves shaped, and by which their values gain
cogency and thus authority. Arguments, then, are indispensable to
claims to knowledge in this nonfoundationalist perspective, for the
reasons they provide for beliefs not only support, relate, criticize and
revise those claims but also are those claims themselves. By the same
token, this nonfoundationalist understanding highlights the degree to
which the contributions of argument to justification are diminished in
a foundationalist understanding of knowledge. Deductive and inductive arguments in such a foundationalist schema justify a truth claim
that itself requires no justification since its epistemic authority is regarded as immediate and obvious. Whatever logical authority justificatory arguments possess in a foundationalist conceptualization of
53
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knowledge derives finally from the "foundations" from which such arguments proceed or to which they lead in an epistemic return to origins.
In this "genetic" conception of justification, such arguments are separable from, and so in some measure supplements to, their "foundations." While the separability of "foundations" and argumentation is a
constant in foundationalist argumentation, the extent of separability
may vary. "Weak" versions of foundationalist argumentation may account for the logical connections between and among derivative, mediate claims to knowledge, showing, thereby, the integrity of the body
of knowledge they present. Or such argumentation may confirm the
purported certainty of foundationalist claims or experiences to which it
has pledged logical allegiance. In comparison to a nonfoundationalist
conception of justification, weak versions of foundationalist argumentation diminish the value of argumentation, though argumentation is
not so separable from its "foundations" that it can be deemed indispensable. "Strong" versions of foundationalist argumentation diminish the value of argumentation even further. Resting assured that
their justificatory explanations mirror the indubitability of their first
principles, strong versions of foundationalism would regard their argumentation to be completely separable from, because they are utterly
supplementary to, the "foundations" they serve. Here arguments, since
they are but glosses to an immediately given truth, are finally dispensable and so matter little if at all.55
REASONING WITH AUTHORITY

In recent years a number of theologians have touted the value of a
nonfoundationalist approach to knowledge for theological reflection.
The advocates of this approach, most notably George Lindbeck, Ronald
Thiemann, Stanley Hauerwas, and Charles Wood, largely have been
Protestant theologians who have found the nonfoundationalist perspective helpful in refuting the apologetical use of universal theories
in many modern theologies and in fostering a descriptive approach to
theological interpretation consistent with a Reformation understanding of theology as scriptural exegesis. While several Catholic theologians have produced works compatible with a nonfoundationalist perspective,56 this approach has often stirred Catholic suspicion, perhaps
55
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because variations on the transcendental method advocated by influential Catholic theologians like Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, and
David Tracy often are cited by Protestant nonfoundationalists as examples of the foundationalist error.57 There are any number of reasons
for Catholic sensibilities to be wary of the nonfoundationalist approach
to knowledge. There is no reason in principle, however, to think that
nonfoundationalist philosophy could not prove helpful in illuminating
Catholic commitments on any number of issues, especially the proper
relationship between faith and reason.
Like any philosophical stance, nonfoundationalist criticism can only
be put to use legitimately in a Catholic setting if measured choices are
made about which of its insights are valuable and how those insights
are used to clarify beliefs that are basically Catholic. Catholic assumptions about the nature of religious reasoning, for example, could not
possibly make room for the typically nonfoundationalist view that all
knowledge is relative or that universality cannot be ascribed to truth
claims. But to the degree that nonfoundationalist sensibilities work to
expose exaggerated and finally unsustainable claims for the justification of belief, and foster an understanding of the workings of reason
true to our actual beliefs and practices, they are indispensable for
appreciating the conduct of right reasoning, including the reasoning
invoked as authoritative in the Catholic tradition by the magisterium,
theologians, and the faithful.
A nonfoundationalist perspective on the justification of belief suggests that the magisterial understanding of argumentation in its
teaching is foundationalist, and even strongly so. Extraecclesial sensibilities would reach this conclusion, no doubt, because the magisterium's authoritative appeal to the charism of its office would appear to
be an immediately justified belief supporting the claims issuing from
the exercise of office. In this view, the charge of foundationalism
amounts to the judgment that magisterial arguments cannot possess
authority since the teaching office does not possess the charism that
supposedly grounds its authoritative claims. But one of the advantages
of a nonfoundationalist perspective is its appreciation for how claims to
knowledge are contextualized, standing always in a particular framework of meaning in which commitment, practice, and belief interrelate
as they serve more basic, if not foundationalist, beliefs. To the degree
that the charism of the teaching office is a part of the common stock of
basic Catholic beliefs, Catholic sensibilities would not find it to be
comparable to the "foundations" that reason alone would criticize in
James J. Buckley, Seeking the Humanity of God: Practices, Doctrines, and Catholic
Theology (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1992).
57
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traditional epistemologies. Yet even within the circle of Catholic faith
nonfoundationalist criticism suggests another respect in which magisterial argumentation is foundationalist and so, measured by the very
values of the Catholic tradition, in need of revision.
On the face of it, the magisterium seems to exhibit a foundationalist
regard for reasoning by skewing the proper argumentative relationship between the Catholic tradition's basic beliefs and the reasoned
extension of those basic beliefs to new circumstances. In Humanae
vitae, for example, natural-law reasoning is so conflated with the tradition's more basic belief in divine providence and human openness to
God's workings in the world that the encyclical's natural-law arguments eclipse their major premise, as though the family lives of believers could only be open to God's will if the practice of artificial
contraception were excluded. Here, magisterial reasoning, now virtually eclipsing the basic belief, takes on the character of "foundations"
that immediately justify the encyclical's teaching. By making maleness an indispensable trait of the savior's humanity, Inter insigniores
also conflates argument with its premise that the priestly office represents the person of Christ, creating thereby "foundations" for belief
that not only immediately justify its conclusion but also do so by contradicting the tradition's basic, albeit indirect, teaching on the nature
of humanity as embraced and saved by Jesus Christ. In both cases, an
arguable claim is imbued with the certainty of a first principle, even
though traditional beliefs more basic than those cited foundationalistically stand ready in the context of faith as viable resources for authoritative argument.
The magisterium's judgment regarding the dispensability of argumentation in its teaching further evinces a foundationalist regard for
reasoning even within the setting of Catholic values, for this judgment
so assumes the obvious certainty of the first principles seen to be reflected in the teaching's conclusion that the arguments by which it is
reached do not share in its authority—an especially surprising stance
in light of the fact that the teaching in question is presented as argument. This diremption between conclusion and argumentation—itself
raised to a general principle of magisterial teaching in the Ecclesial
Vocation of the Theologian—exhibits the foundationalist assumption
that immediately justified beliefs "cause" the truth of mediately justified beliefs, an epistemic aetiology that in strong versions at least
makes both argumentation and its cogency superfluous.
While the magisterium is inclined to explain its regard for the dispensability of argumentation by appeal to the charismatic authority of
its office, a nonfoundationalist approach to the traditional knowledge
it safeguards would expect that same charism to be exercised within
the ongoing justification of belief in the history of faith. Within this
ecclesial context, the magisterium occasionally practices the charism
of authentic teaching by reiterating ancient beliefs so basic to the
tradition's knowledge that they pass unquestioned from age to age.
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Frequently, though, the magisterial charism is exercised in the extension of Catholicism's basic beliefs to present circumstances that call for
their guidance or that challenge customary forms of their application.
Argumentation is rightly regarded not as a merely accidental dimension of this extension but as the very way in which the magisterium, in
the terminology of nonfoundationalist philosophers, justifies its
present teaching with regard to the tradition's ancient and basic beliefs. This, of course, does not mean that the charism of the teaching
office is in thrall to reasoning whose soundness is gauged by philosophical criteria of one sort or another. The justification of the
Church's belief takes place in the Catholic tradition's own authoritative network of commitments, doctrines, and practices. But the explanation of the faith that justification involves must be measured by
standards of coherence and cogency that in their own terms are no less
rigorous than any epistemic ideal. With regard to reasoning in magisterial teaching, this means that the charism of the teaching office is
meaningfully exercised within, and not apart from, the faithful argumentation for uses to which basic beliefs might be put. When employed
by the magisterium to convey its teaching, such argumentation is
properly regarded as authentic and so to matter as much as a teaching's conclusion since both are normatively bound to the tradition they
promulgate.
Our discussion brings us to the modest conclusion that arguments
should be understood as authoritative in the Church's authentic teaching, and as inseparable from the conclusions they advance. In light of
our analysis we can now consider our original problem concerning the
authority of dramatically developing doctrine for Catholic theology.
Our efforts to consider this question, however tentative, must begin
by noting the hermeneutical modesty with which this issue is rightly
approached. The criterion for dramatically developing doctrine presented earlier in these pages offered not a sure method for identifying
such doctrine but rather a heuristic for noticing possible, more likely
candidates for presently authoritative Church teaching that may one
day lose its authority. While reception was the most important aspect
of this criterion, the supplementary aspects of argumentative presentation and cogency together mark doctrine that is developing (because
argument is deemed necessary to mediate basic beliefs to present circumstances) and perhaps developing dramatically (because the very
arguments conveying doctrine that has not been received by the faithful even fail to prove cogent to a wide segment of those in the Church
qualified to judge the validity of argument). As noted earlier, the authority of dramatically developing doctrine is an important issue for
all in the Church, though our concern here more specifically is with the
authority of such doctrine for theological reflection, itself often a considerable influence on the dynamics of development in any form. And
any theological judgment regarding even the possible identification of
dramatically developing doctrine does well to acknowledge its own
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potential for error. After all, our two possible examples of dramatically
developing doctrine have long had a place in the belief, teaching, and
practice of the Church, even if not in the particular argumentative
forms in which they more recently have been presented.
Only the most cavalier disregard for that tradition would judge with
certainty and without ambivalence that these or any doctrines of the
Church are indeed examples of dramatically developing doctrine. Nevertheless, theologians occasionally judge, properly with ambivalence
and without certainty, that a particular doctrine is developing dramatically. No such judgment, though, could undermine the present status
of the doctrine in question as the authentic teaching of the magisterium, for such a consequence would elevate theological assessment
above the charism of the Church's teaching authority. Even as they
stand in the argumentative forms in which the dramatic character of
their development might be recognized, these doctrines still possess
the authority that issues from any pronouncement of the ordinary
magisterium as the authentic interpreter of God's revelation in Scripture and tradition. The authority of doctrine in the Catholic tradition
is not measured solely by what has been or at some future time will be
taught by the magisterium and received by the faithful. Such an expectation would gauge authority statically by reference to unanimity
alone, ignoring the much more contested development that many authoritative teachings have had and continue to have in the Catholic
tradition. Dramatically developing doctrine, then, possesses authority
for Catholic theology, to say nothing of the life of the Church, as long
as it continues to be taught authentically by the magisterium.
Our analysis, however, has led us to value the authority of magisterial arguments as charismatic means of promulgating the tradition's
basic beliefs in present circumstances. While it is important to acknowledge the magisterial authority of these arguments, failures in
their cogency and reception can only mean that their authority remains ambiguous, and so questionable, for the Church. Although apparently oxymoronic from the perspective of a foundationalist regard
for the justification of ecclesial belief in which argument and conclusion are separable, the juxtaposition of authority and ambiguity is
meaningful in a nonfoundationalist regard for the justification of ecclesial belief.58 In this epistemic perspective informed by Catholic commitment, argument, conclusion, and basic beliefs are inextricably
bound together in the historical context of tradition in which the discernment of God's spirit at work in the Church is rarely, if ever, exhaustive. Should magisterial arguments fail to convince, then better,
more coherent, traditionally faithful arguments need to be offered by
those in the Church who have the ability to justify ecclesial belief. The
58
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Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian supports this
directive by encouraging theologians to contribute to the improvement
of magisterial argument, though it expects theological insights to be
communicated in private and assumes that such improvement will be
indifferent to whatever magisterial conclusion has already been
reached. A more dialogical understanding of ecclesia, and one more
committed to Vatican I's teaching on the complementarity of faith and
reason,59 would not fear public discussion in the Church on how its
basic beliefs are logically extended to present circumstances and would
be open to the possibility for such dialogue to be the very means of
doctrinal development.60 The same sensibilities would hold fast to the
necessary consistency between argument and conclusion in the
Church's authoritative teaching, regard the cogency of such teaching
as a value of tradition-bound faith, and remain open to revision in
authoritative conclusion as well as in authoritative argumentation.
Reasoned argument truly informed by and demonstrating the consistency of traditional faith can never be extraneous to the authority of
the Church's teaching, any more than reasoning truly in the service of
faith can be foreign to the purposes of the Church. The expectation that
faithful reasoning will lead to utter unanimity among the faithful
would seem to be a symptom of a foundationalist understanding of its
workings, as erroneous in the sphere of ecclesial knowledge as it is in
any other. When conducted authoritatively, ecclesial reasoning respects the pluralism of argumentative possibilities within the tradition it holds sacred, seeks to align its expectations with what the
Church has believed and continues to believe, and recognizes its own
responsibility to the development of Catholic doctrine, even in the rare
cases when that doctrine develops dramatically.
59

Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion 591, 592, nos. 1797, 1799.
One convincing model for a dialogical ecclesiology is presented in Paul Lakeland,
Theology and Critical Theory: The Discourse of the Church (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990).
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